In the U.S., local governments regulate private land use mainly through zoning. By creating a barrier to entry and lessening competition in local business markets, their regulation has the potential to generate a distortion. This paper assesses the empirical relevance of this hypothesis using microdata on midscale Texas chain hotels and land use regulation data collected from their local municipalities. I construct a static entry model of midscale hotel chains. By endogenizing their entry decisions, the model explicitly considers hotel chains' reactions to the stringency of land use regulation. Reduced form regressions indicate that local markets under stringent regulation tend to undergo fewer entries. To identify the extent to which high entry cost due to stringent land use regulation explains this negative correlation, I estimate structural parameters of the entry model by using a recently developed nested pseudo likelihood algorithm. To verify the robustness of my results, I also employ a bound estimator that is consistent under weak conditions. Estimation results indicate that imposing stringent regulation increases cost enough to affect hotel chains' entry decisions. A decrease in the total
Introduction
In the U.S., local governments regulate private land use within their boundaries mainly through zoning. Zoning regulates private land use from various aspects, including the purpose of land use or the shape of buildings. These regulations impose additional entry costs on new businesses by forcing them, for example, to use expensive materials (e.g., brick) for the exterior of their buildings or to deviate from a prototype building design.
Although business owners can request rezonings or exceptions, these requests need to go through processes that could involve city administration, politics and jurisdiction, and often incur considerable expense. This paper argues that stringent land use regulation generates a distortion in local business markets by increasing the cost of entry and, as a result, lessening competition.
Although people in the legal professions have noticed this anticompetitive effect of land use regulation, 1 it has attracted little attention from economists and few formal analyses have been done.
The goal of this paper is to assess the empirical relevance of this hypothesis using microdata on midscale Texas chain hotels and land use regulation data collected from their local municipalities. Through empirical analysis, I attempt to quantify the size of the distortion and examine who bears its cost. This paper is not intended to be the final word on land use regulation. Instead it focuses on an anticompetitive effect of land use regulation and pays no attention to its other possible benefits and costs. Therefore, the results of this paper are not sufficient per se to make final judgments on land use regulation.
If it generates benefits to society through some other channels (e.g., resolves externalities), land use regulation could be beneficial overall, despite the distortion.
Several facts indicate the relevance of this proposed hypothesis to the lodging industry. First, land use regulation appears to be among the major determinants of entry cost, and hence entry decisions of hotels. This industry is capital-intensive 2 and its primary capital input is undoubtedly buildings. Therefore, it is natural to expect that regulations on buildings have a significant cost impact. If it were not the case, the change of regulation would rarely affect the degree of competition and my hypothesis would have little quantitative importance. Second, competition in this industry is fairly local. Because of the nature of their product, hotels must locate at the place of consumption. Therefore, they cannot sell their product without first having a physical location inside a market. As a result, competitors are limited to other hotels in the neighborhood and entry decisions of local rivals are among the primary determinants of their market power. If competition were nationwide, entry decisions of local rivals would have little impacts on the intensity of competition, and again, my hypothesis would have little empirical relevance. Third, it appears that people in the lodging industry realize that local land use regulation can act as an entry barrier on their competitors. This is indicated by the following quote:
There's a short answer to why certain hotel developers choose projects encumbered with difficult zoning or environmental challenges. It's because once those hurdles are cleared, they're often left with a hotel with desirable barriers to entry (Hotel & Motel Management, 11 August 2003) .
My empirical analysis starts with reduced form regressions to assess any correlation between the number of midscale hotels belonging to the seven largest, midscale hotel chains and that market's land use regulations. As a measure of the stringency of land use regulation, I employ the written-survey-based indices developed by Gyourko et al. (forthcoming) . 2 According to an example shown in Powers (1992) , the capital cost of a typical 120-room hotel accounts for about 20 percent of its total expenditure. This ratio is about twice as much as that of a suburban restaurant.
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Reduced form regression results are consistent with the prediction of my hypothesis. I next construct an entry model for hotel chains and apply it to the revenue data. To make the estimation computationally feasible, I employ the nested pseudo likelihood algorithm recently developed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) . The concern of these estimates is their possible inconsistency when regulation is endogenous. To verify the robustness of these estimates, I also employ a bound estimator proposed by Manski (1997) , whose consistency does not require exogenous regulation. As a last step, by using the structural parameter estimates, I simulate the entry decisions of the hotel chains under three different policies and observe the changes in surplus.
One of the major obstacles for empirical studies of land use regulation is its quantification. Complicated rules and the prevalence of local discretion in the actual implementation of these regulations indicate that no single index is a definitive measure. Acknowledging this difficulty, I employ various measures based on the written survey collected and summarized by Gyourko et al. (forthcoming) . Some of these measures are based on institutional features (e.g., the presence of particular regulations) while some other measures are based on the results of actual implementation (e.g., the average time length to obtain a building permit).
Reduced form regressions indicate that markets under stringent land use regulation tend to have fewer hotels. A drawback of these regressions is that their inability to separately identify the effect of land use regulation on entry cost and local travel demand. Land use regulation could affect local travel demand by, for example, preserving some view that attracts tourists or discouraging constructions of commercial buildings that draw business travelers. When stringent regulation decreases local travel demand overall, this demandside effect can solely generate the observed negative correlation between the stringency of land use regulation and the number of entries. Therefore, the observed negative correlation 5 does not necessarily imply that land use regulation increases entry cost of hotels. To identify the demand-side effect and supply-side effect separately, I need to pursue structural estimation.
I consider a static entry model of hotel chains in which they maximize their expected profits by choosing the number of hotels they open in a local market. The revenue of one hotel in a chain is a function of market-specific revenue shifter, chain-specific revenue shifter and the number of other hotels present in the same market. Since a new hotel cannibalizes the revenue of other hotels in the same chain, the marginal revenue of opening an additional hotel monotonically decreases. The cost of opening one hotel is a product of market-specific cost and chain-specific cost. In addition, each chain receives its own private profit shock that varies with the number of hotels it opens. Since each chain cannot observe other chains' private profit shock, entry decisions are based on their beliefs about their competitors' entry decisions. In a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, these beliefs must be consistent with the actual entry decisions of rival chains.
I estimate this entry model to separately identify the demand-side effect and supplyside effect of land use regulation. The wide availability of the hotel-level revenue data and the entry data makes this identification possible. For example, consider two markets (A and B). Without loss of generality, suppose that a chain opens one hotel in market A while it does not open in market B. The mere entry data does not tell whether this observed decision implies higher revenue, lower cost, or both in market A than market B.
However, once the revenue data becomes available, it is not the case anymore. From the revenue data, researchers can predict the revenue of a hotel under an imaginary market structure. If the revenue prediction of a hotel in market B is similar to that in market A, this prediction -along with the observed entry decision-imply that the cost of opening a hotel in market B is higher than the cost in market A.
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Estimation consists of three stages. I first recover the market-specific revenue shifters from the hotel-level revenue data. Exploiting its panel structure, I can identify marketspecific revenue shifters that may be attributable to both observable and unobservable time-invariant factors. Taking these estimates as given, I next recover market-specific cost shifters by finding a set of parameters that rationalizes both the revenue function estimates and the observed entry decisions. To take into account the interacting entry decisions of competing hotel chains, I employ the nested pseudo likelihood algorithm developed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) . Finally, from the recovered market-specific cost shifters and the land use regulation indices, I draw a statistical inference that stringent land use regulation increases the market-specific cost shifters in the following two methods. I first regress the estimates of the market-specific cost shifters on land use regulation indices as well as other possible cost factors. One potential concern of these regressions is a possible endogeneity of regulation. When regulation indices are correlated with unobservable cost shifters, these regression estimates become inconsistent. To take this possibility into account, I also employ a bound estimator whose consistency only requires that marketspecific costs are monotonic in the stringency of land use regulation. Although it only identifies the bound in which the true parameters fall, this bound estimator adds robustness to my results since they are consistent even when the stringency of land use regulation is endogenous.
The main finding of this paper is the quantitative significance of the distortion argued by the proposed hypothesis. First, estimation results indicate that imposing stringent regulation increases entry cost enough to affect a hotel chain's decisions about entering a market. Second, although they are the immediate payers of the increased entry cost, incumbents shift about the half of their cost increase onto consumers by exploiting their market power. Third, a decrease in the total surplus is larger than the cost increase since 7 the lessened competition generates an extra distortion. According to my simulation results, at least 13 percent of the decrease in the total surplus is due to distortion generated by the lessened competition while the rest comes from the actual cost increase. This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. The role of land use regulation is a main concern of urban economics and numerous empirical studies have been conducted in the past. 3 The focus of these studies is considerably broad, including land price (McMillen and McDonald (1991b) ), land development (Wu and Cho (2007) ), density (McConnell et al. (2006) ) and housing markets. 4 Nonetheless, the role of land use regulation in local business markets has not attracted much attention from economists. 5 This paper is intended to fill this existing gap. The main empirical finding of this paperthat land use regulation actually weakens competition of local businesses by discouraging entry-enhances the understanding of land use regulation. Another contribution this paper makes to the land use regulation literature is its introduction of a state-of-the-art technique for structural estimation. Most existing empirical studies in this area have relied on reduced form estimates for their statistical inferences. Although reduced form estimates have the advantage of flexibility from restrictive assumptions, they cannot separately identify the effects land use regulation has on cost and travel demand. The structural estimation employed in this paper overcomes this difficulty and is able to calculate the explicit cost entailed by weak competition due to stringent land use regulation. In relation to the 3 For a survey of empirical studies in this area, see Fischel (1989) , Pogodzinski and Sass (1991) , Evans (1999) and Quigley (2006) . Regional Science and Urban Economics published a special issue featuring studies of land use regulation. For the summary of these papers, see Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) . 4 A recent skyrocketing of housing prices in large metropolitan areas prompted studies about the effects of land use regulation in housing markets. For example, a series of empirical studies by Glaeser and his coauthors (Glaeser et al. (2005a) , Glaeser et al. (2005b) , Glaeser and Ward (2006) ) claim that a significant portion of increasing housing prices is attributable to stringent land use regulation.
5 Ridley et al. (2007) is the only exception I found. In their paper, the authors estimate the effects of zoning on the number of entries by reduced form regressions for five retail industries (restaurants, bars, grocery, gas/convenience and liquor stores). Unlike this paper, Ridley et al. (2007) considers zoning as regulation that restricts possible store locations rather than high entry cost. 8 literature on empirical industrial organization, this paper belongs to the large literature on firms' entry decisions that originated from classical papers such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992) . 6 Among others, this paper is perhaps most closely related to Ryan (2006) . In his paper, Ryan estimates a dynamic entry model of cement plants and evaluates the welfare consequences of a change in environmental regulation in the Portland cement industry. Since the change in environmental regulation is uniform across markets, he relies on the intertemporal difference of the industrial structure for identification. In contrast, this paper attempts to exploit cross-market differences in land use regulation by employing indices that directly measure the stringency of land use regulation in each market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of land use regulation for the Texas lodging industry. Section 3 summarizes the data used in the empirical analysis while Section 4 presents the results of the reduced form regressions. Section 5 describes the empirical model used for structural estimation. Section 6 explains the estimation method, and Section 7 presents the estimation results. Section 8 demonstrates the results of counterfactual experiments, and Section 9 concludes.
Land Use Regulation for the Texas Lodging Industry
The basis of the current zoning ordinances in the U.S. goes back to 1926 when the U.S.
Department of Commerce drafted the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), which has become a prototype of state statutes on zoning ordinance. 7 The state of Texas adopted its version of the SZEA in 1927. The Texas statute grants municipalities authority over the legislation and implementation of zoning. According to the Texas statute, the purpose of zoning is "promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare and protecting and preserving places and areas of historical, cultural, or architectural importance and significance." 8 Implementation of zoning generally involves several departments of a municipal office. Although its process varies from municipality to municipality, its basic structure is similar. Figure 1 illustrates an example of the administrative process developers need to undergo to obtain building permits. Developers planning to construct new commercial buildings within the boundaries of a local government (Fredericksburg, Texas) first need to speak with city officials in several departments in order to discuss possible problems with the building plans. If the plans do not violate current zoning restrictions, the process is quite simple. For example, developers submit their applications to the Planning and Zoning Commission, which consists of nine members appointed by the mayor. Unless a disagreement is discovered between the submitted plan and the current zoning ordinance, the commission usually approves the plan. Once approved, developers submit a blueprint of their construction to the building department, which ensures the submitted plan meets building codes. Once it is confirmed that the plans comply with building codes, building permits are issued to the developers.
However, if construction plans do not conform with current zoning laws, developers have three choices. They can (1) request a rezoning, (2) request an exception to current zoning, 
Measurement of Land Use Regulation
Quantifying the stringency of land use regulation is a difficult task. Institutional features of land use regulation are hard to compare across local governments. Furthermore, these features might not provide sufficient information when the discretion of local governments plays an important role (and it does) in the actual implementation of regulation. Despite these apparent difficulties, several efforts have been made to measure the stringency of land use regulation. 10 Table 1 Table 2 shows the list 10 See Quigley (2006) and Saks (2005) for recent surveys of these efforts. 11 The subindices not used here due to their little variation between the counties in my sample are (1) a 13 ( Political Pressure Summarizes subjective impressions of the influence of various political groups (council, pressure groups, citizens). Normalized so that its mean and its standard deviation become zero and one, respectively.
Zoning Approval
The number of local government bodies from which projects that request zoning change need to obtain approvals.
Project Approval
The number of local government bodies from which projects that request NO zoning change need to obtain approvals.
Density Restriction Indicates if local governments have minimum lot size requirements of one acre or more.
Open Space Indicates if developers have to provide open space for the public.
Exactions
Indicates if developers have to incur the cost of additional infrastructure attributable to their developments.
Approval Delay
The average number of months for which developers need to wait to obtain building permits before starting construction.
For the precise definitions of other indices, see Gyourko et.al. (forthcoming) . 
Market Definition
In the rest of this study, I limit my focus to local competition between midscale chain hotels.
To determine midscale brands, I follow a scale constructed by Smith Travel Research, an independent consulting firm specializing in the lodging industry. Among the hotel chains owning these brands, I consider the seven major chains. Table 3 This narrowed focus is beneficial since it makes my empirical analysis considerably neat without losing the essential aspects of local lodging markets. First, as indicated by Mazzeo (2002) , the lodging market is highly segmented by service grades, and competition is stronger within segments rather than between segments. 13 For example, Expedia.com, an on-line travel agency, hits 103 options for a one night stay in Austin, Texas. These choices range from a room in a budget motel for $45 a night to a room in a luxury hotel for $259. High grade hotels often provide restaurants, room service and fitness centers in addition to nicely decorated rooms. In contrast, low grade hotels, often called "no frill" hotels, merely provide clean and safe rooms for a low price. These two types of hotels belong to different segments and do not appear to compete against each other. Second, among the three segments of hotels (economy, midscale and upscale), the midscale segment is the largest category in terms of both the number of hotels and the number of rooms. Third, chain hotels have been the primary players in this industry. In 2005, in Texas, chain hotels account for 37 percent of the total number of hotels, 63 percent of the total rooms and 75 percent of total sales. The apparently high ratio of non-chain properties is unlikely to be problematic for my analysis as these non-chain properties consist of independent hotels, and various businesses that are not conventionally considered hotels. 14 Independent hotels are generally considered to be in the economy segment, and because services of these other businesses are different from those of the midscale hotels, their presence should not be important for the business of midscale hotels.
For this study, I consider a county a single local market since more data is available at the county level and its shape is relatively uniform in Texas. since each of these counties has too many hotels to believe that it forms a single market.
After this screening, 60 counties remain. Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of these 60 counties. In terms of population, these 60 counties are larger than those removed for lack of the indices 16 and smaller than the flagship counties of the four largest MSAs. Table 4 reports the summary statistics of variables that describe the 60 markets in my sample. The median market has four midscale chain hotels or 264 rooms, and earns about one million dollars for one quarter. These numbers imply that each hotel has 69 rooms and each of these rooms earns $39 for a night. Table 4 also shows a considerable size variation between the markets in my sample. In terms of population, the size of the market at the sample first quartile is more than four times larger than that of the market at the sample third quartile. More than half of the markets in this sample have access to an Interstate
Summary Statistics
Highway and about one fifth of them have access to commercial airports.
Descriptive statistics of the land use regulation indices are not straightforward because of their lack of units. Instead, I observe the relationship between market size and these indices by constructing a correlation matrix shown in Table 5 . 17 First, land use regulation tends to be more stringent in large markets. Out of the seven indices this paper uses, five of them show statistically significant positive correlation with population. Second, all three significant correlations between these seven subindices are positive, suggesting that local governments implement each individual policy according to certain underlying attitudes such as pro-development or pro-environment. Table 2 for the definitions of abbreviations of land use regulation indices. Correlation coefficients with ** and * are statistically significant at the five and ten percent level, respectively.
sales. For OLS estimation, I employ the robust standard errors to take into account the possible heteroskedasticity in error terms.
The effect of stringent land use regulation on the equilibrium quantity of local lodging markets is not obvious. According to my hypothesis, stringent land use regulation decreases supply of lodging services by increasing the entry cost for hotels. However, its impact on demand is ambiguous. On one hand, stringent regulation could decrease local travel demand by discouraging some businesses to come, hence decreasing demand for business travel. On the other hand, stringent land use regulation could increase local travel demand if it helps to maintain a particular local environment (e.g., nice views or clean water) that is attractive to either leisure travelers or certain industries. Therefore, under the standard supply-demand framework, stringent land use regulation decreases the equilibrium quantity when it decreases local travel demand. However, the effects of stringent regulation on the equilibrium quantity are indeterminate when it increases local travel demand. Tables 6 and 7 Table 4 for the list of control variables. 24
does not change the degree of local competition and no additional distortion is generated.
However, if this observed negative correlation comes from the supply side, stringent land use regulation could be a source of distortion. To identify these two channels separately from the data, I need to rely on a model and estimate its structural parameters.
Empirical Entry Model of Hotel Chains
Consider the following simultaneous static entry game between N hotel chains in a local market. These chains can operate multiple hotels in the same market, and their decision variables are the number of hotels they open. Denote chain i's choice by a i ∈ A i = {0, 1, 2, . . . , K i }, where K i is the maximum number of hotels chain i opens in a local market. I assume that chain i's entry decision in other markets affects neither its own profit nor its rivals' profit in this market. Therefore, entry decisions into each market can be considered as a result of a distinct entry game.
Revenue
Revenue of a hotel is defined as the product of its price and its quantity in a market equilibrium. Ideally each hotel's revenue should be predicted based on the estimates of a structural demand-supply model. However, lack of both price and quantity data rules out this ideal approach. 19 Therefore, as a second-best option, this study relies on a reducedform revenue function for predicting of each hotel's revenue under certain market structures.
I assume that the revenue function of the kth hotel of chain i in a market takes the following 19 One might consider using the price data listed in chains' website to separate price and quantity from revenue data. I do not pursue this approach since rates of hotels are significantly different by customers (e.g. discount for group sales) and dates of reservation, making the analysis significantly complicated.
form:
where a −i = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i−1 , 0, a i+1 , . . . , a N ) is a vector of entry decisions of its rivals, i is a column vector of 1s, x is a vector of market-specific revenue shifters, γ i is a chain-specific revenue shifter and υ is an i.i.d. hotel-specific revenue shock. I assume that the value of υ i (k) is unknown to all chains at the time of entry while its distribution F (υ) is common knowledge. The second and third term of (1) illustrate the effects of competition on the revenue of each hotel. The second term represents the impact on its revenue of competition with all hotels in the market. The intensity of competition is measured by the logarithm of the total number of hotels in the market. In contrast, the third term considers possible tougher competition with rival hotels under the same chain. Since rival hotels under the same chain provide similar service and rely on the same reservation center, they are more likely to compete with each other for the same segment of travelers.
For hotel chain i, its chain-level expected revenue function is the product of the number of hotels it opens and the expected revenue of each hotel:
This specification indicates that opening one additional hotel has two opposing impacts on chain i's total revenue in a market. On one hand, opening one additional hotel increases its total revenue by increasing a i . On the other hand, this additional hotel encroaches on customers of other hotels in the same chain and reduces the expected revenue per hotel.
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Cost Function
Let C i (a i ) denote the total cost chain i incurs when it opens a i hotels in a market. C i (a i ) is represented as the product of the number of hotels it opens (a i ), chain-specific cost shifter (ρ i ) and market-specific cost shifter (δ):
Profit Function
When the entry decisions of its rivals are given, the expected profit of chain i opening a i hotels is written by:
where λ is a scale shifter and
} is a vector of profit shocks which chain i opening a i hotels receives. I assume that the values of i (a i ) are i.i.d.
draws from the Type I extreme value distribution and its values are known to only hotel chain i at the time of entry. Since chain i takes into account the values of its private profit shock i to make its own entry decision a i , its rival chains cannot perfectly predict chain i's entry decisions. Hence, each chain makes its own entry decision based on a belief about its rivals' entry decisions. This belief, denoted by σ −i (a −i |x), represents the conditional subjective probability that entry decisions of its rival chains are a −i when market characteristics are x. This belief is defined as the product of σ i (a i |x) , the conditional subjective probability on chain i's entry decision held by its rival chains. 20 Using these notations, chain i's choice-specific (subjective) expected profit is written as:
where
Equilibrium
Since every chain makes its entry decision based on its beliefs about its rivals' entry decisions, this entry game is of incomplete information. In a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, all chains' equilibrium strategies maximize their expected profit under the conditions that their beliefs are correct. In the equilibrium, these beliefs must be consistent with the actual ex-ante distributions of their rivals' entry decisions. Let's define a function s i (x, i , σ −i (·|x)) that maps market characteristics, error terms and chain i's belief on its rival chains into a choice a ∈ A i . I call this function a strategy of chain i. Formally, a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game is defined as follows:
Definition 1 A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game consists of
2. each chain's belief on its rivals' entry decisions σ * −i (·|x), such that for each chain i ∈ {1, · · · N },
The first condition implies that equilibrium strategy s * i (x, i , σ −i (·|x)) must maximize chain i's profit when its belief is the equilibrium belief, σ * −i (·|x). The second condition implies that the belief on chain i's decision held by its rival chains must be consistent with the distribution of chain i's ex-ante entry decisions.
Proof of the existence of at least one equilibrium of this game is an immediate consequence of the Brouwer's fixed point theorem. However, its uniqueness is not guaranteed in general. 21 As explained in the next section, the estimation method employed in this paper deals with potential estimation problems this multiplicity might cause.
Estimation
The estimation of structural parameters in this entry game takes three steps. Hereafter, I put a subscript m to all variables that are market-specific to emphasize that each sample comes from a specific market. I first estimate parameters of the reduced form revenue function (1). For this estimation, I exploit the panel structure of the hotel revenue data to identify time-invariant, market-specific revenue shifters that are attributable to both observable and unobservable factors. I next estimate cost shifters (ρ i , δ m ) and a scale parameter λ by employing the nested pseudo likelihood (NPL) algorithm developed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) . In this second stage, parameter estimates obtained in the first stage are used to calculate the expected revenue under some particular market structure. Finally, I infer the relationship between the recovered market-specific cost shifters and land use regulation.
First
Step: Estimation of Hotel-Level Revenue Function I estimate the following version of the revenue function that stresses the panel structure of the data set:
where r ikmt is a quarterly revenue of kth hotel that chain i operates in market m. θ 1m is a market-specific time invariant revenue shifter, τ t is a time dummy, υ 1ikm is an i.i.d.
hotel (not chain) specific error term and υ 2ikmt is an i.i.d. error term. I use the standard random effects for this estimation. x mt consists of population, employment, the number of establishments and annual payroll. All of these variables are expressed in logarithm.
Second
Step: Recovering Market-Specific Cost Shifters by the NPL algorithm The second step looks for market-specific cost shifters and equilibrium beliefs that rationalize both observed entry decisions and revenue data under the static entry model. All data comes from the first quarter of 2005.
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The NPL algorithm employed in this step has two advantages over the conventional maximum likelihood. First, this algorithm provides consistent parameter estimates in a computationally light way. The conventional maximum likelihood is computationally infeasible since it requires a set of fixed points for each set of parameters to evaluate a likelihood function. 22 In contrast, the NPL algorithm does not entail finding a set of fixed points to evaluate the objective function and estimates are still consistent while less efficient. Second, the NPL algorithm can deal with a model with multiple equilibria without imposing any equilibrium selection mechanism. This algorithm automatically picks the one that fits the data best. In contrast, the conventional approach needs to impose some equilibrium selection mechanism.
The main idea of this algorithm is quite simple. Each iteration starts with a possibly inconsistent guess about the equilibrium belief
is a guess of equilibrium belief in market m at nth iteration. Taking this guess as a given, this algorithm next searches for the values of (ρ, δ, λ) that provide the largest likelihood under the assumption that the observed data are generated by a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium containinĝ σ * (n) as equilibrium belief. Since each chain makes its decision by takingσ * (n) as a given, its decision becomes a single-agent maximization problem and does not entail finding a set of fixed points. Let Finally, by usingσ * (n) and ³ρ (n) ,δ (n) ,λ (n)´, the algorithm calculates each chain's ex-ante choice probability from its best response function. If this ex-ante choice probability vector is not sufficiently close to σ * (n) , this algorithm goes into (n + 1)th iteration by using this ex-ante choice probability asσ * (n+1) . The iteration is over when σ * (n) and σ * (n+1) are suf-ficiently close. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) calls the set of the resulting parameters the NPL fixed points. The uniqueness of NPL fixed point is not generally guaranteed. When more than one NPL fixed points are found, the one that provides the highest likelihood is a consistent estimate. For that reason, we need to find all NPL fixed points by running this algorithm from different initial values. The following demonstrates how I implement this algorithm:
The Nested Pseudo Likelihood Algorithm 1. In the nth iteration,
is a given. In the first iteration, pick arbitrary values
.
Obtainσ (n)
−im by a simulation using
hat maximize the pseudo likelihood function defined below:
First stage estimates are used to evaluate Π i (a, x m ;σ (n) −im ).
By using
and ³ρ (n) ,δ (n) ,λ (n)´, calculate the ex-ante choice probability of each chain when equilibrium belief is
re true structural parameters:
m°°°i s close to zero, stop the iteration. The resulting beliefσ
re NPL fixed points and denoted by ³ρ * ,λ * ,δ * ,σ * ´. Otherwise, go back to 1 by using
as a new guess.
Third
Step: Inference of the Impact of Land Use Regulation on Market-
Specific Cost Shifters
The last step aims to infer the impacts of land use regulation on the market-specific cost shifter δ m . Let's denote a market-specific cost function as follows:
where w 1m is a column vector of land use regulation indices and w 2m is a column vector of other observable market-specific cost factors and ξ m is an unobservable market-specific cost factor.
I first draw a statistical inference on the effect of w 1 on δ by running a regression. I assume that g (w 1 , w 2 , ξ) is exponential:
Although this regression approach is straightforward, its obvious caveat is possible inconsistent estimates due to endogeneity of land use regulation w 1m . 23 On one hand, land use regulation might increase market-specific cost. Yet on the other hand, local authorities in markets with a high market-specific cost might have some incentive to loosen land use 23 McMillen and McDonald (1991a) and McMillen and McDonald (1991b) examine the possible selection bias in land value function estimation when zoning decisions are endogenous. For instruments, they use an indicator variable that tells whether a parcel is incorporated or not by municipals. This instrument is not applicable in my study since my study focuses on the effects of land use regulation on a county as a whole rather than each single parcel within a county. regulation to attract more business. This is the classic simultaneity problem causing OLS estimates to be inconsistent. A conventional reaction to this problem is the use of instruments. However, it is unlikely to find reasonable instruments that exogenously shift the stringency of land use regulation but not market-specific cost.
For that reason, this paper instead examines whether the OLS estimates are consistent with the results of other estimators that do not presume exogenous regulation. I employ the bound estimator developed by Manski (1997) for this purpose. One notable feature of this estimator is that its consistency only requires the market-specific cost function to be an increasing function of the stringency of regulation. Therefore, its consistency is maintained even when regulation is endogenous.
Consider a population of markets that choose certain stringency of regulation,w 1 , but differ in their market-specific cost factors other than regulation. For given cost levelδ, Manski's bound estimator provides an estimate of an upper boundp ¡w ,δ ¢ and a lower bound p ¡w ,δ ¢ in which Pr(δ <δ|w 1 ) falls. Namely, these two functions satisfy,
On the other hand, the OLS estimates also provide a point estimate of Pr(δ <δ|w 1 ) by assuming the distribution of ξ m is normal. When the OLS estimates are immune from the simultaneous problem, an estimate of Pr(δ <δ|w 1 ) should fall in the bound defined in (4), ignoring the sampling error. Although it is not a formal statistical hypothesis test, this comparison at least helps to examine the robustness of the OLS estimates.
Intuition of Manski's bound estimator is straightforward. Letw 1 andδ as given. The monotonicity assumption implies that when the target regulationw 1 becomes more (less) stringent than the observed level w 1m , we can at least infer that its market-specific cost underw 1 would be no less (more) than the observed level δ m ,
Using this inference, we can estimate b p ¡δ |w 1 ¢ and b p ¡δ |w 1 ¢ from the fractions of samples satisfying (5) and (6) as shown below:
7 Results
First
Step: Revenue Function Estimates Table 8 shows the estimates of the revenue function parameters. To verify the robustness of the key parameter estimates from the choice of regressors, I estimate the revenue function under several different combinations of time-varying market-specific regressors. 24 The estimation results indicate that rival hotels' presence significantly decreases the revenue of each hotel. This impact is much larger when rival hotels belong to the same chain. Also, these estimates are robust in the choice of regressors. According to the estimates, a one percent increase in the total number of hotels decreases the revenue of a hotel in a given market by about 0.24 percent. Moreover, if the new hotel belongs to the same chain, this impact increases to 0.36 percent.
To provide more direct intuitions of these estimates, I calculate how much the revenue of a hotel changes as it has more rival hotels in the same market. I consider the following two situations: (1) all rivals belong to different chains and (2) all rivals belong to the same chain. Figure 3 shows the revenue change of a hotel under these two different scenarios.
The revenue of a hotel is normalized so that its revenue is 100 when it is the only midscale hotel in the market. Figure 3 clearly shows that the decrease in a revenue of hotels is much larger when its rival hotels belong to the same chain. For example, the change from monopoly to duopoly decreases the monopolist's revenue by 15 percent when its rival belongs to different chains. However, this decreases amounts to as much as 22 percent when its rival belongs to the same chain. The first column of Table 9 reports the estimates for the chain-specific cost shifter ρ j and the scale shifter λ obtained by the NPL algorithm. The NPL algorithm works quite well.
Regardless of the values of initial guess for σ m ,σ (n) m always converges to the same value within less than fifteen iterations.
Parameter estimates for the chain-specific cost shifters show that the unit cost of LA QUINTA is the largest among these seven chains and more than twice as much as that of CENDANT, whose cost shifter is the lowest. Moreover, this difference is quite similar to the one in the chain-specific revenue shifters (shown in the second column), which I estimate in the first step. One explanation for this apparently huge difference between hotel chains is their difference in both hotel size and service quality. The third column of Table 9 presents the median number of rooms of a hotel in each chain. Although the size difference does not seem to completely explain the difference in the revenue and cost shifters, nonetheless, it seems to be one of the primary factors that generate these differences. For example, the estimate of the cost shifter of LA QUINTA is about 160 percent larger than that of CENDANT. This seems to reflect the difference of the average hotel size between these two chains. On average, a hotel belonging to LA QUINTA has 114 rooms while a hotel belonging to CENDANT has only 85 rooms. Table 10 shows the summary statistics of the market-specific cost shifter δ m . Its mean value is about $293,000 and its standard deviation is $84,000. Its first and third quartile indicates that half of this sample falls in the range between $240,000 and $340,000. The mean value indicates that the total cost of operating a midscale hotel is about $3,254 a day. Assuming this hotel has 70 rooms, the total cost per room is $46.5 a day. Note that this total cost includes both non-capital cost and capital cost.
Third step: Market-Specific Cost Function Regression OLS Estimates Table 11 shows the OLS estimates of the market-specific cost function (3) under various specifications. Among the seven land use regulation indices, the estimated parameters of Local Political Pressure Index and Exaction Index are statistically significant at the 5 percent level in most of the specifications and at the 10 percent level in all the specifications.
First, the parameter estimates for Local Political Pressure Index imply that the increase of the Local Political Pressure Index from the sample first quartile level to the sample median level increases the market-specific cost shifter by 3 to 4 percent. When this index increases to the sample third quartile rather than sample median, this shifter increases by 10 to 13 percent. Second, the OLS estimates for Exaction Index imply that when the local government in this market starts to collect money from developers for the cost of additionally installed infrastructure, the market cost shifter increases by 20 to 25 percent.
Robustness Check by Manski's Bound Estimator
Figure 4 presents estimate of Pr(δ <δ|w 1 ) for three different thresholds and various levels ofw 1 measured by the Political Pressure Index. These thresholds are equal to the first quartile (δ 25 ), the median (δ 50 ) and the third quartile (δ 75 ) of the second stage estimatesδ, respectively. The solid lines represent the predicted probability based on the OLS estimates in the last column of Table 11 while 
Policy Experiments
This section shows the results of policy experiments, using the parameter estimates obtained in the previous section. The goal of this exercise is to quantitatively evaluate the supply side effect of regulation change on entry decisions of hotel chains and the size of the resulting distortion. To isolate this particular effect, I construct an imaginary environment where land use regulation affects the market-specific cost only. In other words, this imaginary environment shuts down all other possible functions of land use regulation, including its effects on local travel demand and the property values of privately owned land.
I can replicate this imaginary environment only because I have the structural parameter estimates in hand. Reduced form estimates might predict, for example, the change of the equilibrium number of hotels as a response to the change of land use regulation; however, they do not tell how much of these changes come through the demand side or the supply side.
Through these experiments, I first examine whether imposing stringent regulation increases the market-specific cost enough to influence entry decisions of hotel chains. If their entry decisions are rarely affected by changes in regulation, cost increase due to stringent 42 regulation does not generate additional distortion. I next quantify the size of the distortion, if any, and examine who bears it by calculating the changes in both consumer surplus and producer surplus under two different policies.
My simulation considered San Patricio County, as its population size is equal to the sample median. I calculate its market-specific cost when it adopts some imaginary policy by using the OLS estimates in the ninth column of Table 11 . Through these experiments, I consider three imaginary policies: Q1, Q2 and Q3. These three policies are different from the actual policy in their values of the Political Pressure index. The value of this index for each policy is equal to the sample first quartile (Q1), the sample median (Q2) and the sample third quartile (Q3), respectively. I focus on this particular index since its OLS estimate is statistically significant and its sample variation is large enough to choose several points. Using the recalculated market-specific costs, I numerically solve the model and obtain an equilibrium belief. Finally, by using this equilibrium belief, I simulate the distribution of the equilibrium number of hotels, total sales and profits, and the distribution of the changes in both consumer surplus and producer surplus. Table 12 reports the mean of the equilibrium variables of this market under the three different policies. The simulation results support the empirical relevance of my hypothesis that stringent regulation leads to less entry. Under the most lenient policy (Q1), the average number of hotels in this market is 4.5. As the policy becomes more stringent, this number decreases to 4.1 (Q2) and 3.4 (Q3). In terms of the number of rooms, these decreases are equivalent to a 10 percent decrease (Q1 → Q2) and a 30 percent decrease (Q1 → Q3). Combining the change of the total number of rooms and the change of the total sales, my results imply that imposing stringent regulation increases the revenue per room by 3 percent (Q1 → Q2) and 7 percent (Q2 → Q3). These increases are suggestive The market considered is San Patricio County in Texas. Q1, Q2 and Q3 imply that the value of Political Pressure Index is equal to the sample first quarterile, the sample median and the sample third quartile, respectively. All variables except the number of hotels and the number of rooms are in dollar per day.
of higher prices in the market imposing more stringent regulation. 25 Table 13 reports the change of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus brought about by the stringent regulation. The change from the most lenient policy (Q1) to the modest one (Q2) decreases consumer surplus and producer surplus by at least $222 and by $204, respectively. 26 Each of these amounts is equivalent to about 2 percent of the total sales of the market under the lenient policy (Q1). The effects of stringent regulation are more serious for the change from the lenient policy (Q1) to the harsh one (Q3). This policy change decreases both consumer surplus and producer surplus by at least $520 and $541, respectively. The decrease in the total surplus is as much as 10 percent of the total revenue under the lenient policy (Q1).
25 Increase in revenue per room does not necessarily mean increase in prices since not only price but also occupancy rates (the number of rooms sold over the total number of rooms) affect the revenue per room.
26 I calculate the lower bound of the change in consumer surplus between the two different regulations by the difference in consumers' expenditures under the two different prices. I evaluate this difference at the equilibrium quantity after the policy change. Since my model only predicts the product of the equilibrium prices and quantity but does not predict these two variables separately, I use the total number of rooms as a proxy for the equilibrium quantity. The market considered is San Patricio County in Texas. Q1, Q2 and Q3 imply that the value of Political Pressure Index is equal to the sample first quartile, the sample median and the sample third quartile, respectively. All nominal variables are in dollar per day.
This result also demonstrates that the additional distortion generated by the regulation changes accounts for 13 to 15 percent of the change of the total surplus while the actual cost increase is responsible for the rest of the change in the total surplus. To see this, consider hotels entering a market under the modest regulation (Q2). These hotels need to pay $374 more to meet the stringent policy. From this cost increase and the change of the total surplus, I infer that this regulation change generates a distortion that amounts to $52 or 12 percent of the change of the total surplus.
Conclusion
This paper studies the role of land use regulation as a barrier to entry in the case of the midscale Texas lodging industry. I argue that stringent land use regulation lessens local competition by increasing entry costs for potential entrants. This lessened competition generates a distortion by providing hotels that enter with additional market power. The structural estimates obtained in this paper are informative to assess the empirical relevance of this hypothesis.
The estimation results indicate that imposing stringent regulation increases cost enough to affect the entry decisions of hotel chains. Although hotels that enter are the immediate payers of the increased entry cost, they shift about the half of the cost increase onto consumers by exploiting their increased market power. The total surplus decreases more than the cost increase since the lessened competition generates an extra distortion.
This paper is among the first to empirically examine the anticompetitive effect of land use regulation on local business markets. Although people in the lodging business and legal professions have noticed this effect, there has been no formal analysis that identifies it.
This paper also contributes an introduction of structural estimation to the literature. Most of previous studies have relied on reduced form regressions for their statistical inference.
Although reduced form estimates might be more flexible from restrictive assumptions, they do not tell whether these results come through the supply side or the demand side. The structural estimation employed in this paper has the advantage of separately identifying these two effects.
There are several directions in which future work can extend this study. First, the statistical inference of this paper relies on observations from local lodging markets in Texas.
While the number of local markets in Texas and their sample variation are large enough to draw a meaningful inference, the findings of this paper would be more valid if the sample came from several states. One direction of future research may be to verify the robustness of my findings by using a sample from more than one state.
Second, this paper does not explicitly consider dynamics due to the lack of dynamic regulation data. Nonetheless, incorporating explicit dynamics into my empirical analysis framework is potentially important. Dynamic analysis would make my findings based 46 on the static analysis more valid by separately identifying fixed cost and variable cost.
Moreover, dynamic analysis could provide additional insight, which static analysis cannot capture. For example, dynamic analysis might reveal that markets under lenient regulation have higher turnover rates, in addition to more entries. If this is the case, markets under stringent regulation are more likely to have less efficient hotels since the selection mechanism (Hopenhayn (1992) ) does not fully work in these markets. Examining dynamic effects of land use regulation on local business markets is an exciting path for future research.
